North Korean hackers stole information from more than 7,000 cryptocurrency wallets after infecting over 30,000 devices across 100-plus countries, Japan's National Police Agency reported on Sept. 18, in an investigation run jointly with the FBI, the US Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center and agencies in Australia and Germany. The group, tracked as WaterPlum and associated with the threat activity known as Contagious Interview, is assessed to operate under Bureau 313 of the Workers' Party of Korea's Munitions Industry Department, the same bureau Japanese and US authorities say runs North Korean IT workers earning foreign currency abroad. The infections ran from roughly December 2025 to July 2026, and the wallets controlled by the group received at least 1.7 billion yen, about $10.7 million.
How North Korean hackers reached 7,000 wallets
The infection route was employment itself. WaterPlum approached software developers and IT workers through social media, job sites, gig platforms and freelance marketplaces, posing as legitimate AI, cryptocurrency and NFT companies or recruitment services. During technical interviews or coding tests, candidates were told to download files hosted on collaborative development platforms and code repositories, sometimes framed as video conferencing fixes or coding assignments. The packages carried malware families including BeaverTail, InvisibleFerret, OtterCookie, OtterCandy and StoatWaffle hidden in NPM packages, establishing backdoors and remote access tools that let attackers extract browser credentials, keystrokes, screenshots, clipboard data, identity documents, private keys and seed phrases. Web designers, engineers and people working in crypto, blockchain and Web3 were the primary targets, and Japan was among the affected countries.
The campaign's efficiency comes from its inversion of the usual attack: instead of tricking a user into connecting a wallet to a malicious site, it tricks the professional into infecting the machine where the wallet already lives. Security researchers have documented the pattern for years, including assessments that North Korea-linked developers had worked inside more than 40 DeFi projects, and the industry keeps discovering the same tradecraft in new clothes, from vendor email breaches that seed phishing to the laundering networks that cash the proceeds out.
The laptop farm economy, from Japan to bitFlyer
Japanese investigators also dismantled the country's first known domestic laptop farm connected to North Korean IT workers. Under the arrangement, a local facilitator kept computers at their residence while workers controlled them remotely from North Korea, China or Russia, using identity documents supplied by people living in Japan to impersonate them for crowdsourced contracts, with payments routed through facilitator-controlled bank accounts. Workers tied to the investigations sent crypto and other assets worth hundreds of millions of yen overseas. The same playbook has produced US prosecutions: two American facilitators were sentenced to 18 months this year for running laptop farms that served nearly 70 companies and generated more than $1.2 million, bringing the US total of sentenced facilitators to eight over five months, and a federal judge ordered forfeiture of roughly $212,700 in USDC and USDT traced to worker payment addresses.
The bitFlyer case shows the hiring front up close. In May 2025, a suspected North Korean IT worker applied for an engineering role at the Japanese exchange using another person's identity and a Gmail contact, reaching the application system through VPN and proxy services. In the online interview, the applicant claimed to be Malaysian and living in Finland, gave abstract answers to detailed technical questions, repeatedly checked another monitor, had occasional voices in the background, resisted relocating to Japan and insisted on being paid in cryptocurrency. bitFlyer identified the pattern and declined to hire, and no damage was reported. A similar attempt was previously detected at Kraken. Critically, investigators tied the infrastructure together: IP addresses used by WaterPlum matched addresses the workers used to connect to laptop farms and crowdsourcing platforms, and the suspected bitFlyer applicant used matching infrastructure, leading the NPA and FBI to assess Bureau 313 as the common command.
What companies should actually do
The report reads as a checklist for anyone hiring in crypto or engineering. Treat take-home tests and developer-tool downloads as an attack vector, and run them in isolated environments. Vet interviews for the specific signals the Japanese agency documented: proxy and VPN access, off-camera assistance, evasive answers on technical depth, refusal to relocate and crypto-only payment demands. Verify identity documents against the person on the call, not the resume. And assume that wallet data on any compromised developer machine is already in Pyongyang's pipeline, because the 7,000 wallet records were not stolen from exchanges, they were stolen from employees' laptops, the same layer of trust that sanctions and law enforcement actions cannot reach. The bureau running both the malware and the payroll is the tell: for Bureau 313, hacking and hiring are the same business, revenue.












































