Trezor and BitBox are warning users after a breach at a shared third-party email provider let attackers send phishing messages from legitimate corporate channels, and the fake Trezor email exploited a real recent trauma: it was titled "Critical Security Alert: STM32 Entropy Vulnerability," a fiction designed to borrow panic from Coldcard's genuine entropy disaster. "Our third-party e-mail provider has been breached. Please be aware that the email named 'Critical Security Alert: STM32 Entropy Vulnerability' is not coming from us, and it's a phishing attempt. Do not click on any link. We have taken down the domain, and we are investigating," Trezor posted on X. BitBox issued a parallel dispatch: "There is currently a phishing email going around that's pretending to come from us. Please do not follow the instructions in the email! We are currently investigating."
The attack surface is not the wallets. Hardware isolation keeps private keys off the internet, and nothing in this incident touched the devices. The attack surface is the SaaS periphery: the email newsletter vendor shared across multiple Bitcoin companies, the logistics provider, the e-commerce stack. Attackers breached the marketing channel, harvested the contact lists, and sent highly credible mail from infrastructure the recipients already trusted.
Trezor Phishing Lands on a Year of Leaked Customer Data
The credibility problem compounds: Trezor is a known quantity to attackers because Trezor customers are already partially mapped. The ShipMonk logistics breach disclosed August 13 exposed 13,689 customers' full names, emails, phone numbers, and shipping addresses, then expanded on September 4 by roughly 67,000 more U.S. customer records, bringing total exposed records to about 80,689. A phishing campaign aimed at a population whose shipping addresses are already circulating carries a secondary risk the industry rarely discusses: the combination of leaked home addresses and known hardware wallet ownership elevates physical coercion risk, the same class of threat seen when Irish crime gangs started storing victims' seed phrases in rented vaults. The sector's hardware security conversation obsesses over silicon while its vendors' marketing and logistics chains quietly leak the targeting data.
The trauma-baiting is the sophisticated part. Coldcard's real entropy flaw, a firmware config error dating to March 2021, drained 594 BTC worth roughly $38 million from about 500 wallets, and the exploiter has been moving the stolen funds in waves. An attacker who references a genuine, recent, headline-griving vulnerability in a fake alert is running a script the target's fear has already rehearsed. BitBox, for its part, patched two severe firmware flaws of its own in August with no funds stolen, so the fake BitBox mail rode the same news cycle.
No Secure Element Survives a Convinced Human
The uncomfortable truth: the best hardware wallet in the world loses to a user who types a seed phrase into a convincing fake site. No secure element prevents the owner from authorizing the theft themselves. That is why these campaigns target email, not firmware. The defense that works is procedural, not technical: firmware updates come only from the vendor's own site typed by hand, never from links in mail; security alerts are verified on the company's official X account before any action; and seed phrases are never entered on any website, ever, for any reason. Companies can help by never emailing links that request keys, and Trezor's takedown of the sending domain shows the response playbook is improving.
Watch for the vendor name behind the breach if Trezor or BitBox discloses it, because a shared newsletter provider implies a shared blast radius: more brands' subscriber lists may be circulating with the same send-again infrastructure. The wallets are fine. The mailing lists are the breach.













































