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Zeitgeist
Prediction MarketTier-3On-chain prediction market + futarchy (Substrate)

Zeitgeist

A Substrate Layer 1 for prediction markets: ZTG-settled outcome tokens, a staked dispute court, and futarchy that lets markets decide policy.

Visit website

Key Facts

TypeOn-chain prediction market + futarchy (Substrate)
Chain / RailZeitgeist's own Substrate Layer 1 in the Polkadot ecosystem — settlement in ZTG, the chain's native token; no ETH, USDC, card or bank rails are documented. Selected foreign assets are allowed as market collateral.
CollateralZTG — outcome tokens redeem for 1 ZTG per winning share, not for $1, and trading fees are paid in ZTG; Zeitgeist's docs allow selected foreign assets as collateral as well
JurisdictionGlobal and permissionless by design — anyone can create a market and the site names no restricted territories. The published market-creation rules exclude the United States in practice: markets that would create a way for US citizens to bet are on the list Zeitgeist removes.
Data ConfidenceVerify

Scale Signal

No current volume, open-interest, trader or liquidity figures are published on zeitgeist.pm or docs.zeitgeist.pm (checked 30 September 2026). The only quantitative anchors the docs give are configuration constants — a 100M ZTG genesis supply, a 500 ZTG minimum juror stake, and 1,000/200 ZTG market-creation bonds — not usage. Third-party dashboards carry figures; the primary source does not.

Overview

Zeitgeist answers a different question from the regulated exchanges on this list. Kalshi and Polymarket US are licensed venues where the product is a dollar-settled contract and the licence is the moat. Zeitgeist is a public blockchain where the product is a token, the rulebook is code, and the ambition is to be the layer other people build prediction markets on — its own documentation describes the chain as “designed and optimized to be used as an SDK for anyone looking to implement their own prediction market technology”.

That makes it a different kind of listing to compare, and a different kind of risk to take. There is no operator to hold accountable, no supervisor to escalate to, and no fiat on-ramp documented in its own materials. Everything below is taken from zeitgeist.pm and docs.zeitgeist.pm; where those sources are silent, this page says so rather than filling the gap.

A Layer 1 built on Substrate

Zeitgeist runs its own Layer 1 chain on Substrate, the framework behind Polkadot and Kusama. It is not a contract deployed on Ethereum and not an app renting space on someone else's rollup: the markets, the liquidity pools behind them, the dispute court and the governance machinery are runtime modules on Zeitgeist's own chain. The documentation names them directly — zrml-prediction-markets, zrml-neo-swaps, zrml-court and zrml-futarchy — which matters when you compare it with a smart-contract protocol, because fees and upgrades are decided at the chain level rather than by contract migration.

The project's own framing is decentralisation-first: “No single entity controls our network, and its distributed governance mechanisms ensure it stays that way.” As the governance detail further down shows, that claim carries qualifications built into the runtime.

How a Zeitgeist position actually settles

This is the part that catches people arriving from a dollar venue. The base asset is ZTG, the chain's native token, and outcome tokens redeem for 1 ZTG per winning share — not for one dollar. Trading fees are paid in ZTG. The genesis supply was 100 million ZTG, counted on-chain in Pennocks at 10,000,000,000 to the token. The docs note that selected foreign assets can also serve as collateral, but ZTG is the default and the only asset accepted for the bonded actions described below.

So a winning trade is not a dollar profit. Your payout is denominated in a volatile asset, and your realised return is the market call plus whatever ZTG did between entry and redemption. A market trading at 0.60 here and 0.60 on a dollar venue is not the same payoff described two ways; it is two different payoffs.

Categorical and scalar markets

Two shapes exist. A categorical market lists discrete outcomes — Yes/No, or every runner in a race — and pays the winning token in full while the rest go to zero. Zeitgeist's guidance for anything beyond a yes/no question is to add a catch-all option, and the docs point to the Kusama Derby as the cautionary tale: when the defined outcomes all missed, the catch-all token “None” was what actually resolved.

A scalar market bets on a number inside a range set at creation, using Long and Short tokens rather than categories, and redeems them proportionally. With a range of $1,000–$1,200 that resolves at $1,180, Long pays 0.90 and Short pays 0.10; resolve above the upper bound and Long pays 1.00 while Short is worthless. This is the shape futarchy runs on, and the shape people mean when they say a prediction market can forecast a price rather than an event.

Creating a market is a bonded, gated action

Anyone can create a market, but not for free, and the documentation is specific about the two routes.

RouteBondWhat happens next
Advised200 ZTGThe Advisory Committee decides whether the market is valid. Until it rules, no liquidity pool may be deployed and no complete sets bought or sold. A rejected market forfeits the bond.
Permissionless1,000 ZTGNo approval needed and the market can trade immediately. Zeitgeist reserves the right to remove it later, and says it will where it expects 10x more harm than benefit.

Bonds are returned once a market resolves cleanly. A separate oracle bond is posted by whoever reports the outcome, and it is slashed if the report is not faithful. The docs flag the obvious trap: the market creator names the oracle and funds that bond, so naming an address that never reports burns the creator's stake while the unwitting oracle walks away untouched.

The published rejection rules are candid about why the gate exists. Markets are refused for vague questions, missing resolution criteria, outcomes that ignore major possibilities, and start or end times that make no sense — on the reasoning that “if it has any chance of confusing people or resolving ambiguously, we will not approve it”, and because a market that resolves too soon cannot be taken back.

Resolution: oracle, grace period, then disputes

Every market runs the same sequence. It opens at its start block or timestamp, closes at the end, then sits in a grace period during which all activity halts so trading stops before anyone reports. The oracle then has a fixed reporting window. Miss it and the creator's stake is slashed while any address can step in and report as an outsider; the market moves from closed to reported, not yet resolved.

That report is provisional. A dispute window follows, and the mechanism used inside it is chosen when the market is created — either Authorized, where the Advisory Committee resolves it, or the on-chain court. Only when the window closes without a successful challenge does the outcome become final and redeemable.

The court: commit, reveal, appeal

The court is Zeitgeist's most distinctive design and its most ambitious claim. It is a stake-weighted plurality mechanism built on the Schelling point: jurors vote as encrypted hashes during a vote phase, then reveal during an aggregation phase so every raw vote can be matched to the hash it came from, and the outcome with the most revealed votes wins. Zeitgeist credits Kleros as the model.

Jurors and delegators lock ZTG to take part, and weight decides who gets drawn into a case. Three appeals are allowed; at the fourth the case leaves the court entirely and becomes a global dispute, in which every ZTG holder can lock funds behind an outcome and the heaviest side wins. The economics are hard-coded rather than discretionary: a minimum juror stake of 500 ZTG, a first-round draw of 31 times that (15,500 ZTG), and by the final appeal round 255 draw weights — roughly 127,500 ZTG — pulled from the pool. Jurors who vote against the plurality forfeit a multiple of the minimum stake, and that money is redistributed to the jurors and delegators who backed the winning side.

Two details are worth reading before treating a court-governed market as safer than a straightforward one. The participant pool is capped (MaxCourtParticipants), so the lowest-staked participant is displaced when a larger one joins, and exiting takes an inflation-period lock before funds return. Decentralised resolution is real here, but it is slow, capital-intensive, and depends on enough honest stake showing up in the draw.

Futarchy: the part nothing else on this list does

Zeitgeist's headline governance idea is futarchy — Robin Hanson's “vote on values, but bet on beliefs”. The welfare measure is set by a vote; policy is then decided by markets, because prices aggregate what informed traders actually believe will happen. The chain implements this in the zrml-futarchy pallet, added in runtime v0.6.0.

The mechanism is narrower than the marketing suggests. A proposal is submitted with two markets — one on whether the proposal will be enacted, one on the welfare measure at a future time — combined through a combinatorial pool into four positions. If the long-if-enacted position prices above long-if-not-enacted, the proposal is judged to improve welfare. The trigger is deliberately conservative: only root can call the submission extrinsic, so a futarchy vote must first clear an ordinary token-holder democracy proposal to get there at all.

Liquidity comes from pools, not market makers

There is no market maker quoting both sides; depth comes from liquidity pools, and the providers earn the fees paid by swappers while carrying the risk of being left holding losing outcome tokens. The docs put that trade-off bluntly: as a liquidity provider on a prediction market, “you are essentially betting against the informants' ability to predict future outcomes”.

Two designs appear in the documentation. Default pricing uses Zeitgeist's own Rikiddo scoring rule, a liquidity-sensitive automated market maker built on the Othman–Sandholm–Pennock–Reeves model, and the docs note that only one scoring rule is currently available. Separately, parimutuel markets use a “losers pay winners” pot that needs no liquidity at all: every bet goes into a shared pot and the winners split it in proportion to their stake. It suits short-lived casual markets, works only for categorical markets, and the docs list its drawbacks rather than hiding them.

Who it suits

Zeitgeist is the pick for someone who wants the mechanism itself rather than a product around it: conditional and combinatorial bets that span markets, exposure denominated in a chain token instead of dollars, and resolution decided by staked strangers rather than a company. The combinatorial work is inherited from Gnosis's conditional tokens design, and it lets you bet on a contingency — that a candidate wins if they are nominated — rather than a single event. For a trader whose main needs are liquidity, tight spreads and a known counterparty, the venues with dollar settlement and published volume are the better fit, and Zeitgeist's own documentation does not pretend otherwise.

What to check before you deposit

Four things. First, that the market you want is deep enough to fill your size, because all depth is user-provided and slippage in a thin pool is unforgiving. Second, which dispute mechanism that specific market uses, since Authorized and court-resolved markets behave very differently once an outcome is contested. Third, that you can source ZTG and get it back out, because no fiat rail appears anywhere in Zeitgeist's own materials. And fourth, read the resolution criteria and the catch-all option before trading: on a chain where a market can be removed after the fact, and where a badly written question resolves to whatever the criteria literally say, the market text is the contract.

Regulatory Status

Unlicensed and unregulated: no financial supervisor, no fiat custody and no corporate operator is named for the markets themselves — bets, disputes and governance all settle on Zeitgeist's own Substrate chain in ZTG, with the platform's published rulebook doing the work a regulator does elsewhere. Enforcement is split between a standing Advisory Committee, which approves advised markets, can close a market on a two-thirds vote, destroy one unanimously, force changes to on-chain identities and resolve disputes for markets using the Authorized mechanism, and the staked court for everything else. The rulebook is unusually explicit about the lines: markets are removed if they would “cause Zeitgeist to break national laws”, with markets creating a way for US citizens to bet given as the example, and bets on individuals being harmed, terrorism predictions about named places or people, and market text or images that break its conduct rules are listed as always rejected. Because there is no US-regulated entity behind Zeitgeist, it faces none of the state gambling litigation now aimed at Kalshi and Polymarket US.

Features & Market Details

Zeitgeist does not publish a dated, exchange-wide fee schedule the way a licensed venue does. Its costs sit in three places in the documentation — a pool swap fee, the bonds that gate market creation, and the stakes and penalties inside the court — and none of them is quoted in dollars, because the unit is ZTG. What follows is what the primary sources state, in the terms they state it.

The pool swap fee

Trades in a Zeitgeist liquidity pool carry a 0.3% fee, charged in the pool's base asset rather than skimmed in cash. Zeitgeist's liquidity documentation describes how it is handled: the fee stays in the pool, and instead of being paid out it is folded back into the pool's balance so the product of the reserves rises — which is to say the fee accrues to the liquidity providers who supplied the depth, compensating them for the risk of holding losing outcome tokens.

Two consequences follow. Because the fee is taken in kind, your cost is denominated in whatever asset the pool runs on, usually ZTG, so its cash equivalent moves with the token. And because pricing comes from a pool rather than an order book, the fee is only part of your cost: slippage on a thin market can easily exceed it, and the docs demonstrate exactly that with a worked example in which buying one ETH from a shallow pool moves the price from $4,000 to $4,444.

Parimutuel fees

Parimutuel markets charge differently. When you buy parimutuel shares the external fee is deducted from your collateral before the rest of the transaction runs, and the amount left after that deduction has to clear a minimum bet size defined in the parimutuel pallet. If you back an outcome nobody else did and it wins, the docs give a specific answer rather than letting the pot swallow your money: where the winning token has a total issuance of zero but the pot is not empty, any parimutuel share is redeemable at its original price of one unit of collateral.

Bonds: the real cost of using the market layer

The largest amounts are locked rather than spent, and they scale with how much control you want over the listing.

ActionAmountReturned?
Create an advised market200 ZTG advisory bondYes, if the Advisory Committee approves it. Rejection forfeits the bond.
Create a permissionless market1,000 ZTG validity bondYes, once the market resolves — unless the market is removed for breaking the platform's rules.
Report an outcome as the oracleOracle bond in ZTG, posted by the creatorYes, if the report is faithful. A failed or absent report is slashed.

Note who carries which risk. The creator funds the oracle's bond as well as their own, and the documentation is explicit that a creator who names an unwitting oracle will most likely lose that stake while the oracle is not penalised at all. The bond also returns only after resolution, so on a long-dated market your ZTG is tied up for the life of the question.

Court stakes, penalties and the cost of appealing

Disputes are not free, and the amounts are configuration constants rather than discretionary calls.

ParameterValue
Minimum juror stake (MinJurorStake)500 ZTG
Stake drawn for the first court round31 × MinJurorStake = 15,500 ZTG
Draw weights at the final appeal (round 3)255, or roughly 127,500 ZTG
Appeals before a case moves to a global disputeThree
Penalty for voting against the pluralityn × MinJurorStake, paid to the jurors and delegators who backed the winning outcome

The requested stake climbs with every appeal, on the formula 2^appeal × 31 + 2^appeal − 1, so a case that reaches the final round asks for more than eight times the capital the first round did. Joining is capped too: the participant pool has a maximum size and is sorted by stake, so a larger staker displaces the smallest. Leaving takes time — you request an exit, then wait an inflation period before the unused stake comes back, and any amount already drawn into an active case stays locked.

Funding, deposits and withdrawals

No fiat rail is described anywhere in Zeitgeist's own documentation — no card, bank transfer or custodial deposit path appears on the site or in the docs — so plan on arriving with assets already on-chain. The default collateral is ZTG, the chain's native token, which is also the only asset accepted for governance, court staking, collator selection and market-creation bonds. Selected foreign assets can be used as collateral for markets, but everything that keeps the chain running is paid in ZTG.

On the test network, Battery Station, the same token is called ZBS. Amounts are handled in Pennocks — 10,000,000,000 to the ZTG — which is what you will see if you interact through the SDK or polkadot.js rather than the app.

Market lifecycle and the timing you can set

When creating a market you set the period in blocks or in Unix timestamps measured in milliseconds, and the app lets you use ordinary dates for it. A grace period, which may be zero, then halts all activity after the close so trading stops before the oracle may report. The reporting and dispute windows follow, and only once the dispute window closes does the outcome become final. The docs describe one failure path plainly: if the oracle never reports within its window, the creator's stake is slashed and any address can report instead.

SDK, API and data access

Zeitgeist is unusual on this list because its own chain is pitched as the product: the documentation describes the protocol as an SDK for anyone who wants to run prediction markets or futarchy of their own. There are SDK and CLI guides, market metadata is written to separate on-chain storage, and there is a guide to monitoring a collator node, so the intended audience is builders as much as traders. If you are used to a REST API and a web dashboard, expect to work closer to the chain — polkadot.js through the official apps is the route the docs give when something is not exposed in the interface.

Limitations worth knowing

  • Parimutuel markets cannot be exited. Once you buy a share you hold it to resolution, the odds are not fixed when you buy because later money dilutes your payout, and the docs describe a specific failure mode in which a market whose outcome is already known can be gamed by pumping more money in to dilute the other winners.
  • Liquidity providers carry the market risk. The docs compare providing liquidity to betting against the informants, and a thin pool produces slippage on the way in and on the way out.
  • A committee can intervene. The Advisory Committee approves advised markets, can close a market on a two-thirds vote, can destroy one with unanimous approval, can force changes to on-chain identities, and resolves disputes for markets using the Authorized mechanism. Decentralised resolution is real, but it is not the only resolution path.
  • Removal is retroactive for permissionless markets. There is no approval step, which means an invalid or harmful market can trade first and be taken down afterwards.
  • The United States is excluded by rule. The published rules list removal of markets that would “cause Zeitgeist to break national laws”, with markets creating a way for US citizens to bet given as the example.
  • Parts of the documentation describe the testnet. Token naming (ZBS on Battery Station) and some module versions are development references, and the futarchy pallet is documented from its introduction in runtime v0.6.0. Treat the mechanics as design documentation and check the live chain for the current state.
  • No usage figures are published. Neither the site nor the docs carry a volume, open-interest or trader count, so liquidity has to be judged market by market inside the app rather than from a headline number.

The short version: Zeitgeist is the most interesting mechanism on this list and the least like a brokerage. Its costs are paid in ZTG, its safeguards are bonds and stakes rather than insurance, and the number that matters most — how much money is actually in the market you want — is not published anywhere except inside the app itself.

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